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According to the surveillance data from the Taiwan
Center for Disease Control (Taiwan CDC), there
were 373 confirmed cases of non-polio enterovirus
infection with severe complications in 2008. The
cumulative incidence in September 2008 reached
a record high for the same period of the year
since the first recorded epidemic that claimed 78
lives 10 years ago in Taiwan.1 The failure of the
Department of Health to prevent history from re-
peating itself after all these years upset Dr Monto
Ho, a member of Taiwan’s national academy 
of sciences, Academia Sinica, who led the team 
at the Division of Clinical Research, National
Health Research Institutes (NHRI) of Taiwan in
1998 to investigate the epidemiologic aspects of
the first outbreak.2 As an expert in epidemiology,
microbiology and virology, Ho lamented the
persistence of the epidemic and condemned the
vaccine preparation policy. In the 2008 annual
member meeting of Academia Sinica, he expressed
his strong disappointment at the incapability of
leading research institutes to develop even the
simplest type of vaccines that might prevent the
sometimes lethal infection.
Ho’s outspoken criticism drew the public’s 
attention to Taiwan’s current environment of vac-
cine research and development. It is now com-
monplace for Taiwan’s biomedical community
to hold that the greatest difficulties in develop-
ing prophylactic vaccines against enteroviruses
lie not in the barriers of knowledge or tech-
nology but in certain social and institutional
hassles.
Although enteroviruses infect millions of peo-
ple worldwide each year and may develop into
various clinical conditions, the generally low mor-
bidity and mortality rates and the availability of
inexpensive preventive measures keep major phar-
maceutical companies from investing in vaccine
development. However, it is argued that there
might be a niche market for Taiwan’s vaccine 
industry, especially when the recent outbreaks of
non-polio enterovirus infection with severe clin-
ical illness have all occurred in the Asia-Pacific
region. In view of the special vulnerability of the
region, together with the advantage of preventing
the spread of viruses when their hosts may be un-
aware of their presence,3 developing enterovirus
vaccines with public funds to supply at least the
Asia-Pacific market would seem to be a worthwhile
business.
Indeed, appropriating public funds for entero-
virus vaccine development has never been chal-
lenged in Taiwan. Government support has been
modest. The National Science Council alone spent
US$6 million in funding enterovirus-related re-
search in the past few years. This figure does not
include the research and development budget
available for the NHRI, Taiwan CDC or the
Department of Health to undertake vaccine 
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development. A national Implementation Framework
for Enterovirus Vaccine Development was adopted
by the Cabinet in June 2008 to appropriate ex-
clusive budgets for the next few years to develop
vaccines. Public investments in biomedical re-
search, which reached US$500 million in fiscal
year 2008, are usually one of the most generous
among total government R&D expenditure as 
the nation is eager to transform itself from an IT
factory into a biomedical technology island.4
Reasons other than money account for the
current predicament. One editorial of a local news-
paper provided its own diagnosis.5 The editorial
attributed the failure to a harsh legal system that
deters decent researchers from conducting vaccine
trials. According to the editorial, granting research-
ers immunity from criminal charges will not only
support the nation’s burgeoning biomedical in-
dustry but also secure the development of vaccines
that will provide the needed immunity in this cur-
rent public health crisis. The editorial envisions a
crowd of researchers yelling “get me (legal) immu-
nity, if you need (medical) immunity”.
The diagnosis upon which the prescription 
of legal immunity is ordered by the editorial is,
however, based on two apparent errors. First, the
editorial wrongly believes that civil liability in-
curred in connection with clinical trials can be
willfully waived in an informed consent and that
criminal law without the possibility for exemp-
tion thus, in comparison, constitute an inextri-
cable threat to researchers. Nevertheless, asking
subjects to waive liability is a clear violation of
international ethics guidelines,6,7 which stipu-
late that subjects shall not be asked to waive any
of their legal rights, or releases the investigator
from liability for negligence. Second, the edito-
rial mistakenly assumes that because biomedical
investigators in the United States and European
countries are granted general immunity from crim-
inal charges, jurisdictions that do not offer the
same pose an uncivilized threat to researchers. Yet,
even the United States, the country often thought
to be exemplary of the most generous band, does
not actually grant such general immunity even in
a public health emergency.
At first glance, the call to grant legal protec-
tion to vaccine researchers resonates with the
Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness
Act (PREPA) of the United States that was passed
in 2005. To encourage the development of life-
saving countermeasures, such as an H5N1 avian
flu vaccine, PREPA shields manufacturers, among
others, from suit and liability, unless willful mis-
conduct is involved, for injuries caused by coun-
termeasures employed to combat a public health
emergency.8 Nonetheless, the editorial prescrip-
tion and PREPA are different in very significant
ways.
For one, the legal protection that PREPA pro-
vides is not a general immunity from federal
criminal prosecution.9 It is true that vaccine trials
unavoidably involve risks. The fact alone does
not support the call for immunity. There is un-
known uncertainty or total ignorance beyond the
comprehension of currently available knowledge
for which researchers cannot be held liable civilly
or criminally. There is, on the other hand, fore-
seeable risk or known uncertainty discovered
previously in animal or in vitro studies that in-
vestigators should assess and manage until the
probable harm does not apparently outweigh
the potential benefit so as to warrant clinical tri-
als on human subjects.10 Knowingly failing to per-
form risk assessments or to manage foreseeable
risks to an acceptable degree before conducting
trials violates the standard of conduct in human
subject research and amounts at least to a reck-
less act. Immunity is only needed and justifiable
as a public policy when residual risks remain even
when measures to manage them have been reason-
ably taken. Going a step further to argue for a gen-
eral immunity is simply unjustifiable. The editorial
suggests a solution that major Western countries
dare not prescribe so unscrupulously.11,12
The widely held impression that fewer re-
searchers or doctors in the United States are con-
victed for medical or research negligence probably
results from the fact that researchers or doctors
in the United States are usually prosecuted for
recklessness or intentional acts and not for mere
criminal negligence.13 In contrast, because of the
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inadequacy of other accountability mechanisms,
such as peer review and professional discipline,
and the relative infrequency of successful civil mal-
practice litigation, criminal law in Taiwan, as in
Japan and some European countries,14 plays a far
greater role in the regulation of medical and re-
search error where criminal negligence, along with
recklessness and intentional acts, is routinely pros-
ecuted. Unless alternative accountability mecha-
nisms are in place to correct unintended error in
medicine and research in a systematic, effective,
and reliable way, there is no reason on equal pro-
tection grounds that the same negligence criteria
that apply to all other walks of life in daily and
professional life should not be applied to doctors
and biomedical researchers. Granting immunity
even for criminal negligence requires that certain
prerequisite conditions are met.
Similarly, when legal immunity deprives in-
jured persons of their right to a remedy, an al-
ternative compensatory mechanism must be
established.15 This is why PREPA, in addition to its
liability protection, creates a concomitant state-
funded no-fault compensation system. Moreover,
since liability is not imposed on researchers for
honest ignorance or unknown uncertainty, sub-
jects are indeed more vulnerable than researchers
when society fumbles for a light in the dark. A
stand-alone compensation mechanism can also
be provided to compensate injured subjects for
their special sacrifice to society. Immunity with-
out any compensation is simply bad policy.
It is a myth yet to be seriously confirmed that
Taiwan’s criminal law is so unjust or stringent
that liability protection is a fair exchange for bio-
medical researchers to conduct clinical trials. It
is, however, an undeniable fact that vaccine trials,
which necessarily involve healthy subjects, would
require not only a heroically altruist public but
also a just and trustworthy legal infrastructure,
which prevents and corrects error effectively and
redresses loss justly, upon which true altruism
can securely rest. Before such an infrastructure is
made available, no immunity (legal or medical)
can be possible.
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